CONTENTS

Kieran O'Dwyer

Nacie Rice

Noel Galwey

Peter Fitzgerald

Thomas Conway

Michael Murphy

1

AN GARDA SIÚCHÁNA MANAGEMENT JOURNAL

communiqué

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL MURPHY is a native of Waterford and joined An Garda Síochána in 1967. He is currently the Divisional Officer in charge of Wexford/Wicklow Division. He has previously served in Blanchardstown, Cabra, Crime Task Force, Special Detective Unit, Crime and Security at H.Q. and Enniscorthy. He was Police Commissioner, UNOSOM 11 in Somalia in 1994. He has attended at the Dutch Senior Police College and holds a B.A. Degree in Police Management and a Masters Degree in Law from Trinity College Dublin.

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER NACIE RICE, a native of Co. Mayo, is in charge of the Eastern Region. He is the holder of a BA Degree in Police Management and a Graduate of FBI National Academy in Quantico Virginia (Foreign Students Programme). Assistant Commissioner Rice previously served in the Emergency Response Unit, was Officer in charge of the National Surveillance Unit, and a Divisional Officer of Dublin North Central (Store Street) and Donegal Division. He was also the Project Manager for the Garda Air Support Unit.

2

SUPERINTENDENT THOMAS CONWAY is a native of Ennistymon, Co. Clare who joined An Garda Síochána in August 1974. He is currently the Superintendent in charge of the B District, Dublin Metropolitan Region (South Central Division) comprising the stations of Pearse Street and Harcourt Terrace. He has previously served in Store Street, Shankill, Enniskerry, Blacklion, Co. Cavan, Dún Laoghaire and Bridewell, Dublin. Prior to his current appointment he served as Superintendent in charge of Cahirciveen, Co. Kerry and 'M' District DMR South (Tallaght and Rathfarnham). He holds a BA Degree in Police Management and a Diploma in Management and Industrial Relations.

SUPERINTENDENT NOEL GALWEY is a native of Co. Kerry. He joined An Garda Síochána in 1970, and is currently District Officer at Clonakilty, Co. Cork, Cork West Division. He previously served in Cork City and the Garda College, Templemore. He is the holder of a BA Degree in Police Management, a Diploma in Social Studies and a Certificate in Supervisory Management.

KIERAN O'DWYER is Head of the Garda Research Unit. He has held that position since the Unit was established in 1994. Prior to that he worked in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and in various Government Departments. The Garda Research Unit works on a variety of topics, including public attitudes, Garda policy and operations, resource management, and crime and criminology. His personal research interests include policing, juvenile crime and restorative justice.

Garda Public Attitude Survey 2002

Main Findings

Kieran O'Dwyer

Mr. Kieran O'Dwyer, Head of Garda Research Unit

INTRODUCTION

This article presents findings from a survey of public attitudes to the Gardaí carried out early in 2002 and compares the main findings with those from previous surveys. This year's survey asked mainly about Garda service, policing priorities and fear of crime. It provided information that could not be got in other ways for a range of performance indicators[1] that form a vital part of the Garda framework of performance management and public consultation[2].

This year's survey was large enough to allow assessment of Garda performance in each Division under key headings. All in all, 10,405 respondents took part, with a minimum representation of 400 in each Garda Division. This was ten times larger than previous surveys. The fieldwork was carried out by Research and Evaluation Services (RES), a Belfast-based company that won the contract after an EU-wide competition. RES also carried out two previous Garda surveys[3,4]. Comparability with earlier surveys was maximised by retaining the exact wording in as many questions as possible[5].

Respondents were selected from the electoral register in the first instance and then matched as far as possible with telephone listings. Where no telephone number was identified, a questionnaire was sent by post with an option of completion using a free-phone number. Letters of introduction were sent in all cases and reminder/thank you letters were issued to participants in the postal survey. Two versions of the questionnaire were used. The same core questions were asked in both the telephone and postal questionnaires, but to save time, where information was not required at the Divisional level, some questions were omitted from the telephone survey or were rotated between respondents. The survey findings that follow have been re-weighted to take account of sampling procedures and non-response rates. They are presented as point estimates here, but the true values are likely to lie within a range of +/- 1% at national level and +/- 5% at Division level.

SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE

All respondents were asked about their overall satisfaction with the Garda service to the community in 2001. Some 86.7 per cent were satisfied or very satisfied and 13.3 per cent were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. No comparison can be made with previous surveys as they did not ask the question of all respondents. The highest satisfaction levels occurred in Mayo, Roscommon/Galway East and Cork West and the lowest in DMR West, DMR South and DMR North Central. See Table 1. There was little difference in satisfaction levels between male and female

respondents. Older respondents tended to express greater satisfaction than younger respondents, with over a quarter of those aged 65 or older saying that they were very satisfied. As regards housing tenure, those renting from the public authorities recorded the highest percentage of "very satisfied" responses. When "very satisfied" and "satisfied" options are combined, there was little or no difference between the categories.

TABLE 1   OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH GARDA SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY DURING 2001

Division	very satisfied %	satisfied %	dissatisfied %	very dissatisfied %	Total
all	17.4	69.2	10.9	2.4	10045
highest	22.2	69.7	6.7	1.5	402
lowest	8.7	72.8	13.3	5.1	417

The total number of respondents can be less than overall sample size due to missing values, here 360. Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

4

Satisfaction levels of victims of crime were somewhat lower. Just under half (44%) said that the Gardaí contacted them after their initial report. Ten percent said they were contacted in writing. Over half of victims (52%) reported having been given the name of the Garda investigating the incident. Just under half (48%) expressed satisfaction with being kept informed of progress with their case, ranging from 65 per cent in Galway West to 23 percent in Cavan/Monaghan. It would appear that recent changes to Garda policy on victims of crime are not yet being fully implemented.

Thirty-eight per cent of respondents reported having contact with the Gardaí in 2001. The main reasons for self-initiated contact were to have passport forms signed or to report a crime or disturbance. The main type of Garda-initiated contact was to carry out a routine vehicle check or as part of a crime enquiry. The vast majority of visitors to stations (91%) were dealt with more quickly than expected or within the time expected, while eight out of ten respondents who telephoned the Gardaí said that their call was answered promptly. This was up on 2000. Nine out of ten said their call was answered promptly or within a short delay. Nine out of ten said that the Garda gave the station name when answering. The majority of respondents said that the Garda's manner as regards helpfulness, competence, sensitivity, politeness and interest met or exceeded their expectations. Percentages with these views ranged from 93 per cent for politeness to 85 per cent for interest.

Very few respondents (5%) sought an emergency Garda response by dialling 999 or 112. Of those who did, 83 per cent had their call answered within 10 seconds (excluding those who could not recall). The

response arrived within 15 minutes in 57 per cent of cases (excluding cases where no response was considered necessary). Over 60 per cent were satisfied with the service while 37 per cent were dissatisfied.

Thinking of their overall contact with the Gardaí, 82 per cent of respondents expressed satisfaction and 18 per cent dissatisfaction. This is down on the 89 per cent satisfaction level achieved in 1994 (when more were also prepared to say they were "very satisfied") but this could reflect higher expectations as well as service levels. Satisfaction levels ranged from 91 per cent in Cork North and Cork West to 75 per cent in Donegal and 76 per cent in DMR North and DMR West.

Almost two-thirds (64%) felt that the Garda service needed to be improved. The suggestions most frequently mentioned were for more Gardaí on foot patrol, more Gardaí, longer station opening hours and greater enforcement of traffic laws.

Nine out of ten respondents (89%) regarded their local Gardaí as approachable. This is significantly higher than in the last two surveys. Only five per cent thought that the local Gardaí were unapproachable, an improvement on previous years. See Table 2. The percentage saying that local Gardaí were unapproachable ranged from 2 per cent in Cork West to 7 per cent in DMR South. Almost six in ten respondents said that they knew a Garda by name in their local station, up substantially on 2000 and 1999.

TABLE 2 APPROACHABILITY OF GARDAÍ AT LOCAL STATION

	approachable/ very approachable %	unapproachable/ very unapproachable %	don't know %	Total
1994	85	3	12	936
1999	68	3	29	1000
2000	57	4	40	1000
2002	89	5	6	10278

Percentages do not add-up to 100 because of rounding.

As regards Garda visibility, 29 per cent of respondents reported seeing a Garda in their locality that day or the day before. More than half (55%) had seen a Garda in the previous week. These levels are the same as in 2000 and higher than in 1999. Despite the improvement in reported visibility, satisfaction levels were lower, lending support to the suggestion that expectations of service are increasing over time. Fifty-nine per cent of respondents expressed satisfaction with the level of Garda visibility, ranging from 74 per cent in Roscommon/Galway East to 39 per cent in DMR West. It is noteworthy that satisfaction with visibility was lowest in the six DMR Divisions, despite the higher levels of policing proportionate to the geographical areas involved.

5

Six out of ten respondents felt that the general level of Garda activity and the level of foot patrol in the locality had stayed about the same as the previous year. Ten per cent thought that general Garda activity had decreased while 14 per cent thought the same about foot patrol.

Some 87 percent of respondents rated the Garda performance in their locality as either fairly good (63%) or very good (24%). This was an increase of five percentage points on the previous survey, and ranged from 92 per cent in Cavan/Monaghan to 79 per cent in DMR West. Seventy-one per cent of respondents felt that the Gardaí were doing a good job in their locality as regards road safety.

6

Satisfaction with the service provided to those involved in road traffic collisions was higher than in the 2000 survey, with 79 per cent expressing satisfaction. Five per cent of respondents were involved in collisions in 2001 that were dealt with by the Gardaí.

One in eight respondents (12.3%) reported that a Garda had ever behaved towards them in a way they considered unacceptable. The experience of unacceptable behaviour ranged from 6 per cent in Wexford to 25 per cent in DMR North Central. DMR Divisions occupied six of the seven lowest rankings. The type of unacceptable behaviour cited most frequently was being disrespectful or impolite.

POLICING PRIORITIES

As in previous surveys, respondents were asked to assign priorities to Garda tasks and to give their perception of the priority given by the Gardaí. Top of the respondents' own priorities were responding to emergencies, targeting organised crime, investigating crime, enforcing drug laws, enforcing drink-driving laws, joy-riding, and enforcing speed laws. Lowest priority was given to supervising licensed premises, advising on personal safety and home security, advising businesses on crime prevention, enforcing immigration laws and patrolling by motorcycle.

This is a key and major change from previous surveys. Enforcing the drug laws has been the policing priority accorded most importance by respondents in successive surveys from 1994 to 1999. Now, responding to emergencies is the new number one priority. This change of attitude may be linked to the survey finding that the predominant response to juvenile offending and drug abuse should be treatment rather than punishment.

Respondents' perceptions of Garda priorities differ from their own priorities both in order and level of priority. The public attach a higher priority to all tasks than they perceive the Gardaí attach (i.e. more say that the priority to a task should be very high or high). They also rank 12 tasks out of 26 higher than they perceive the Gardaí rank them (for

example they put tackling the sale of alcohol to under-18s in 9th place on their list of priorities but perceive the Gardaí to rank this task 23rd). The largest differences occur in respect of tackling the sale of alcohol to juveniles, dealing with underage drinking on the streets and in pubs, and dealing with joy-riding. Sizeable differences also appear in respect of enforcing laws in relation to seat belts, dealing with vandalism, patrol on foot or bicycle and providing help and support to victims of crime.

EXPERIENCE AND FEAR OF CRIME

One in eight respondents (12.5%) reported that they or another member of their household had been the victim of a crime in 2001. This represents a sizeable increase on the level of crime victimisation in previous surveys (6% in 2000, 7% in 1999) but is consistent with the 12 per cent victimisation rate found in the Central Statistics Office Quarterly National Household Survey 1998[6] and the 18 per cent increase in headline offences reported in 2001. The majority of victims (70%) experienced just one crime incident. Cork West Division had the lowest crime rate, at a quarter of the national average while DMR North Central was more than double the average.

The most frequent crimes were domestic burglary (30% of victims), criminal damage to a vehicle (20%) and assault (13%). Assault showed the greatest increase compared with previous surveys (9% in 1999 and 2000). Theft of vehicles showed a substantial decrease. The vast majority of crimes (84%) were reported to the Gardaí, although the rate was nevertheless slightly down on previous years.

Seven out of ten respondents said that they felt safe walking in their neighbourhood after dark, but three in ten felt unsafe. Feelings of insecurity were higher in Dublin, other cities and large towns. The vast majority felt safe alone in their homes at night, although one in ten felt unsafe. A quarter of respondents felt less safe walking after dark now than a year ago, while 44 per cent felt less safe now than 6 years ago. Just over half of respondents (52%) worried about becoming a victim of crime. They were more worried about other family members and friends. Almost seven out of ten (69%) worried that these others would be victims.

More than eight in ten (84%) thought crime was increasing in Ireland, although a majority of respondents (56%) were more optimistic about their own area. More than eight in ten (82%) thought crime was a serious problem in Ireland. Considerably more respondents thought juvenile crime was a major problem in the country as a whole than thought it a problem in their own area (72%: 23%). Drug crime featured highest in both categories. At the national level, juvenile crime and violent crime were also seen as a major problem by three out of four respondents. Over half of respondents (52%) believed that crime could be attributed to drugs or drink or both.

7

8

OTHER ISSUES

The size of the survey allowed a degree of innovation, with different questions asked of different participants so that a minimum sample size was ensured without making the questionnaire unreasonably long. The opportunity was used to seek views on various other aspects of the Garda Síochána (including human rights, equity, redress and representativeness) as well as the criminal justice system more generally, crime prevention and victim support.

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with various statements about the Garda Síochána. Most views were supportive, with, for example, 75% agreeing that they could rely on the Gardaí for help if their rights were infringed. However, a majority (60%), disagreed with statements that people have a real say in deciding Garda priorities and that when people are dissatisfied with what the Garda do, it is easy to have the matter corrected (59%). A third of respondents agreed that the Gardaí serve the rich more than the poor.

Asked about aspects of the criminal justice system, eight out of ten respondents agreed that prison does not prevent re-offending, while two thirds felt that alternatives to prison should be used for all but the most serious crimes and offenders. Six out of ten felt that the criminal justice system favoured the better off. Seven out of ten disagreed that penalties for possession of cannabis or ecstasy should be more lenient. A similar number felt that young people caught in possession of cannabis or ecstasy should be treated as criminals, but should be cautioned for a first offence. The majority of respondents felt that the predominant response to juvenile offending and drug abuse should be treatment rather than punishment. At the same time, three out of four respondents felt that the criminal justice system was too lenient on offenders.

Forty-five per cent of respondents said that they were in Neighbourhood Watch and Community Alert areas. Of these, 15 percent said they were kept informed regularly about criminal activity in their area, down on 2000 but up on 1999. However, half of the respondents stated that they were never kept informed, up substantially on previous surveys. Just over half of respondents (52 per cent) felt that the schemes were successful or very successful in preventing crime – up on the 1999 figure – but almost a third felt that the schemes made no difference.

Seven out of ten respondents said that they had heard of the organisation "Victim Support". Four per cent of these said that they had received information from a Garda about the organisation. Levels of awareness and contact were only slightly higher among victims of crime. A majority of respondents thought that Victim Support provided a useful service to the community. If those who expressed no opinion are excluded, over 90 per cent held this view.

CONCLUSION

The survey provides a wealth of information of immediate value as well as food for thought for the longer term. The Commissioner has often commented that public support is highly valued but cannot be taken for granted. The survey provides encouraging evidence of continuing support for the Garda Síochána despite recent difficulties. Some of the results, especially overall satisfaction, can give a welcome boost to morale. The positive views are tempered by poorer results in other areas, including aspects of service to victims of crime and experience of crime and fear of crime. Improvements are required.

Divisional Officers have been supplied with the results for their areas, including local satisfaction rates, suggestions for improvement and policing priorities. They will assess the implications at local level and consider necessary steps to improve or maintain service. A particular focus of attention will be on how lower-ranking Divisions can improve their results by drawing on the experience and insights of the higher achievers.

The 2002 Survey was the largest and most detailed of the surveys commissioned to date by the Garda Síochána. The results will feed directly into the decision-making process and help bring about improved service and responsiveness.

9

_____

REFERENCES

1 Garda Síochána (2001), Annual Policing Plan 2001, Government Publications Sales Office: Dublin

2 Garda Síochána (2000), Corporate Strategy 2000-2004, Government Publications Sales Office: Dublin

3 Garda Síochána (2000), Garda Síochána Public Attitudes Survey 2000, Research Report No. 5/00, Garda Research Unit: Templemore

4 Garda Síochána (1999), Garda Síochána Public Attitude Surveys 1994,1999 – Comparison of Key Results, Research Report No. 2/99, Garda Research Unit: Templemore

5 Millar D. (2001), "Attitude Surveys: How important are they within An Garda Síochána?", Communique, September 2001, pp 8-13, Garda Síochána: Dublin

6 Ireland (1999), Quarterly National Household Survey: Crime and Victimisation, September- November 1998, Central Statistics Office: Cork

Nacie Rice

Historical and Cultural Challenge to the development of the Strategic Initiative in An Garda Siochána

Non-Core demands on Garda service

Assistant Commissioner Nacie Rice

1. THE EFFECTS OF NON-CORE DEMANDS

The role and function of An Garda Síochána have become so broad that the organisation is fast becoming a victim of 'initiative overload'. The demand for service in terms of volume, technological development and a desire to achieve greater efficiency, has caused huge changes in work practices especially in the past ten years.

Changes in how we operate our policing service are reflective of societal changes globally but these are experienced locally. The effects of BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease impacted globally all over Europe but the effects were felt locally especially along the border where permanent checkpoints were set up to prevent cattle being smuggled into the republic. The people served by An Garda Síochána have seen the organisation develop into a more technologically advanced service that appears to rush around in cars at the expense of having Gardaí on the beat, using high-tech equipment and communications and working towards meeting the policing plan performance indicators.

Amongst the many demands for logical core policing requests, An Garda Síochána is accustomed to being, equally, a 24 hour available social service often acting as mediators and counsellors in domestic situations, as much as a law enforcement agency.

An Garda Síochána largely ignored the size and resource implications of our involvement in the non-core functions and carry out tasks frequently better suited to other agencies. However the momentum towards achieving improved efficiency and delivering a better service in the core roles such as crime fighting, will demand that the nature of what Gardaí do, be examined more critically. An Garda Síochána always performed "service" functions in the course of their duties. Over the years the nature of the functions has changed or we would still see 'constables digging draining ditches and mending roads'.

However, the pressures placed on Garda resources to fulfil non-core functions as a readily-available 24-hour service is as real today as it has ever been. Many of these functions continue to be dealt with by An Garda Síochána because of their difficulty to classify. The adage seems to be, if in doubt "call the Guards". Indeed callers will often exaggerate to

10

communiqué

AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA MANAGEMENT JOURNAL

ensure there is a Garda response. For example the standard call "youths causing annoyance" can mean anything from a few children playing football on a street to a gang of teenagers tearing down hoarding and vandalising the street. Another example is absconders from secure and other homes who, wishing to return, phone the homes from phone kiosks, only to be told by social workers to contact the Gardaí so that they can be picked up and returned. This might well be because of a lack of resources on the part of the social services, but conveying those absconders to the home is a taxi function that has become accepted as a Garda function. Gardaí often undertake these tasks rather than present them to another agency or because other agencies can not, or fail to provide 24-hour service, and rely on the Gardaí to take up the slack.

11

The debate that remains unresolved is the extent to which the Gardaí should be involved in non-core functions, the current size of this involvement and its effect on other areas within our remit. As An Garda Síochána continues to develop more along the lines of core roles, any expansion in concentration on these core roles can only be achieved by the reduction of the non-core activity. This would require the expansion of other social services to take on the roles that we relinquish. If we are to deliver 'a better service' we will be obliged to hive off non-core activities and services. This will be as much a consequence of rising public demand and expectation as it is of economic sense.

This hiving-off need is particularly true if resources are kept at the same level, or reduced. If the Government increases the strength of the Garda service by two thousand, An Garda Síochána may be more capable of retaining their extended role. Besides, in this event, new Garda initiatives in response to local needs in the community we serve will require us to examine existing initiatives to produce the most effective outcome.

Pressure to perform an ever-expanding portfolio of functions also occurs through government initiatives. For instance, the discovery of BSE in cattle in this country, as well as the more recent foot and mouth crisis, and the fear that these would be further spread if cattle were moved from Northern Ireland, led to a Garda operation along the border, that had more static checkpoints than at the height of the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland.

We can do a wonderful job on core functions like fighting crime if we eschew signing unemployment forms and other non-core roles. A decision will have to be made as to what is required; an extremely efficient and effective organisation dedicated to core functions, but at the expense of reduction or even total removal of other current Garda service roles. Is this what the public want? After all they still ring us for a large and varied response to matters that are either non-core services or not remotely police related matters. In terms of any crises, the public see the Gardaí as a help agency, with virtually no boundary to their role.

Research conducted by the (UK) Police research Group for the Home Office concluded that,

> "Dealing with situations involving the mentally disordered is an extremely commonplace, difficult and time consuming role undertaken by police officers in both urban and rural environments".[1]

This is a perfect example of a role which the Gardaí also undertake because of the vacuum within other services, and it is neither crime related nor significant in the measure of performance.

12 An Garda Síochána is the only 24-hour crisis help facility that does not have its functions and specific operations remit detailed. If the tasks that Gardaí do were specified and resources allocated to match, some stark choices might have to be made regarding the roles that would no longer be in the Garda remit and who would take them over. Many aspects of what Gardaí do are dealt with by them because of the potential of what might happen rather than who, instead of Gardaí, may more appropriately be asked to do the job. An example of this, especially in some Dublin stations, is the Garda role in dealing with sudden deaths. Clearly any suspicious death should be dealt with by the Gardaí but many hours of Garda time are spent dealing with the deaths of persons in circumstances that are not suspicious. In the United States this latter function is carried out by the Coroner's Office staff.

While looking at the core and non-core values we wish to 'keep' as Garda functions, there are some thoughts that need to be considered. The tolerance that the public have for An Garda Síochána evolves from the knowledge that we assist society. It is unclear how they would react to the organisation if we performed only law enforcement and the other coercive functions. It is possible that cooperation in certain areas of the community might alter, thus affecting support and intelligence. If Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) is to change what we do, will it be the same as change in a fragile eco-system, where one small change in one area may have a larger effect on society elsewhere?

Some recent schemes and initiatives like Neighbourhood Watch have a double-edged value. If they are not to descend into vigilantism, they must increase the demand for Garda response and service delivery. In considering future working practices and our role in society in SMI terms, the question must be asked; will we have to be more selective so that we do not overburden ourselves with initiatives, or is rationalisation of tasks to be a feature of our service?

SATISFACTION LEVELS WITH GARDA SERVICES

An Garda Síochána has traditionally been seen as a service organisation. I have already discussed the dichotomy involved between being more

efficient and effective and in continuing to provide services, which we have done by tradition.

A number of public attitude surveys in recent years would appear to fly in the face of the general mood for developing a more efficient and effective service by dispensing with our non-core services.

TABLE 1 LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH GARDA SERVICES 1986-1999.

Survey Year	Survey Title	Question posed	Percentage
1986	European Attitude Survey	Satisfaction with Garda service	86%
1994	ESRI Survey	Satisfaction with Garda service	89%
1996	European Attitude Survey	Satisfaction with Garda service	86%
1999	RES Survey	Satisfaction with Garda service	89%
2002	RES Survey	Satisfaction with Garda service	87%

In the 1994 ESRI "Survey of attitudes to the Gardaí" the survey[2] asked the public perception of what the Gardaí's priorities should be. Respondents were presented with a list of fifteen tasks, which the Gardaí might be expected to concentrate on. They were asked to indicate the level of importance, which they thought should be attached to each task. The tasks listed included many of the areas of Garda activity i.e. crime-investigation, drugs law enforcement, speeding, drink driving, vandalism etc. The extent to which An Garda Síochána is under pressure to deal with a wide range of demands is reflected in the fact that every task on the list was considered 'Very Important' or 'Extremely Important' by over half of the respondents. This survey suggests to the writer that the public have set perceptions of what An Garda Síochána should be doing and show little evidence that they should change from that perception.

In the 1999 RES "Garda Síochána Public Attitudes Survey"[3] of the sixteen tasks presented which the Gardaí might be expected to concentrate on, there were no tasks to which a majority of respondents were prepared to ascribe low or very low priority. Again this survey indicates to the writer that the public are satisfied that An Garda Síochána is currently performing the correct tasks and have little interest whether these are core or non-core activities. This is borne out in this edition of Communique. A full update on the 1994 and 1999 fundings is in the 2002 Public Attitude Survey results at page 3. The Policing Plan 2002 is tackling all the priorities identified by the public.

In relation to SMI, there are crucial decisions which must be considered further to ensure that by becoming more efficient and effective, we do not alienate the public we serve. In the light of the above survey results I ask if a more critical examination of non-core tasks must be undertaken before they are handed over to other agencies.

2. POLICE CULTURE EXPLORED

"The (police) occupational culture has been characterised as extremely powerful. Indeed it is often depicted as so uniform and sustained as to exercise a monolithic authority which degrades the ability of senior officers to manage and subverts attempts to exact greater accountability of constables for their actions".[4]

Fielding, 1988:2.

14

The culture and structure of any organisation develops over time and in response to a complex set of factors. A number of factors can be identified, that are likely to play an important role in the development of any corporate culture. These include history, primary function and technology; goals and objectives; location; management and staffing; and the environment[5].

Because so little has been written regarding the culture of An Garda Síochána much of my research has been based on the British policing system. Indeed this lack of information suggests a need for more research and studies to be undertaken in this area.

In examining organisational culture, I focussed on the work of Johnson (1992) who presents a cultural web, which brings together different aspects for the analysis of organisational culture[6].

- **Routines** – the way members of an organisation behave towards each other and to those outside the organisation (how things are done).
- **Rituals** – the special events through which the organisation emphasises what is particularly important (formal inspections, saluting senior officers, discipline regulations etc)
- **Stories** – told by members of the organisation, (famous arrests, the one that got away, famous chiefs and famous detectives etc).
- **Symbols** – such as logos etc (Garda crest, flag, uniform).
- **Power Structures** - the most powerful individuals in the organisation (hierarchical rank structure but also certain members at the lowest rank because of expert knowledge etc have certain informed power e.g. ballistic or fingerprint experts who are usually at Garda rank.)
- **Control Systems** - measurement and reward systems that emphasise what is important to monitor (Usually promotion or appointment to a specialist post).
- **Organisation Structure** – which reflects power structures. (Formal hierarchical rank structure but also persons in certain sections or with certain expert knowledge can exert more power than people of same rank in other areas).

GARDA CULTURE EXPLORED

An Garda Síochána is facing unprecedented pressure to change the way it delivers the policing service in this country. The PULSE (Information

Technology) programme, The TETRA communications system, SMI together with a continuous raft of new legislation from criminal justice to the protection of children are some of the more easily identifiable catalysts for change. There is also a subtle underlying realisation on the part of many Gardaí that the traditional service delivery mechanism which has changed little for many years, cannot survive long into this the 21st century.

However change for An Garda Síochána can be difficult to accomplish as instanced by an attempt in the early 1990s to introduce Performance Development and Review (PD&R) to all ranks. It was viewed as a means to introduce accountability and was resisted internally to the point where it was abandoned. Similarly when a new CAD (Computer Aided Despatch) system was introduced in Dublin Metropolitan Region, it too was fiercely resisted because it also was perceived as a means of introducing accountability.

15

I contend that the key to achieving change at the operational face of An Garda Síochána rests with meaningful and effective management intervention, which should include consultation.

To hold out hope for those who have to engage the Garda culture it is necessary to explore the dynamics involved. Skolnick (1996) argued that certain common tensions and problems are inherently associated with the police task in liberal democracies[7] and these generate a shared sub-culture amongst the police rank and file, which facilitates the resolution of these difficulties. The core characteristics Skolnick emphasised were suspiciousness, internal solidarity coupled with social isolation and conservatism.

Reiner (1997:1017) notes;[8] " Charged with upholding the law and preserving public peace, the police are likely to have an elective affinity for conservatism. Embracing change...(is) wont to generate a degree of cognitive dissonance in police officers." In an essay titled "Do they mean us" Keith Duffy suggests that from a limited research project he had carried out on Garda culture, "it would appear to me that Skolnick's assertion applies equally to members of the Garda Síochána in that officers develop, become socialised to, and ultimately subscribe to a distinct occupational form and through this become a distinct social form".[9]

Certainly the power of the rank and file culture to thwart managerial efforts is clearly demonstrated by considerable research evidence. An example of this would be the Blue Flu episodes when rank and file Gardaí reported sick in huge numbers in protest at perceived low pay rates. This was a response to the legal prohibition on Garda members going on

Leadership and Machiavelli

Machiavellian **adj.** elaborately cunning; scheming; unscrupulous.
Oxford English Dictionary.

Machiavelli is the father of modern political science who throughout his life and career was an honourable man and a loyal patriot. Not long after his death, Machiavelli's name became synonymous with deceit, cynicism, and evil machinations. The Prince is the first great leadership manual – and one of the most misunderstood. To understand The Prince, you must understand Machiavelli.

MACHIAVELLI: A NOBLE AND LOYAL PATRIOT

Machiavelli lived in the middle of the Italian Renaissance, a period that witnessed great changes in politics, religion, technology, exploration and war. He came from a prominent Florentine family. Although not university educated, he held several important political positions until 1512, when the Pope's army reinstated the Medici family as rulers of Florence. He was thrown in jail and beaten when suspicion fell on him that he might have attempted to overthrow the new regime. He maintained his innocence and was released to return to his family farm. It was there he wrote The Prince. He presented the work to the man whose minions had tortured him.

The disconnect exists because Machiavelli was presenting advice to a particular kind of leader – a principe – which we have translated into "prince", but which means something entirely different. A "principe" is a leader of a sovereign state who must compete with others like him in a world in which there are no laws or rules that govern them all. Depending on whether the principe is a monarch or an elected head of state, he may be governed by internal rules, but there are no external ones.

Thus, some of Machiavelli's more barbaric advice (such as kill the ruler whose area you took over as well as his family) won't work today when the rule of law prevails. On the other hand, his advice that, if a ruler is forced to choose between being loved or being feared, he should choose to be feared (but not hated), is advice for debate, even today.

BE WILLING TO DO BAD

Machiavelli advised a principe that to do the greatest good he must occasionally be willing to do bad. Modern leaders are sometimes forced to recognise what Machiavelli understood – that sometimes the ends do justify the means, that it is better to be both feared and loved.

To be an effective leader, you must be able to lay down rules and evenhandedly deal with those who violate them. Evenhanded justice inspires a sense of security among followers. McKinsey's Katzenback (1999), who advises on making teams work at the top, says that they must be disciplined, but be selective. Best results will flow from learning to apply six elements of team discipline – small size, complementary skills, common purpose, clear performance goals, explicit working approach, and mutual accountability. Real team performance demands that members of a group understand and apply this simple discipline, as well as

Garda Public Attitude Survey 2002

Immigration Control

Interagen

P O I N T

deal with the inevitable conflicts that team basics create for advocates of executive discipline. Until the group recognises the value of the six elements of team discipline – and even-handedly dealing with conflict – and is selective about when to apply each, valuable leadership capacity will be lost.

DECISIONS, DECISIONS

Decision-making is a major element of leadership. It can be fun, exhilarating, an ego trip, a tremendous burden, agonising and scary. A leader's legacy is determined by the long-term effects of his or her decisions. The contrarian leader's approach to decision-making can be summarised in two general rules:

- Never make a decision yourself that can reasonably be delegated to a lieutenant
- Never make a decision today that can reasonably be put off until tomorrow.

Most decisions can be delegated to a lieutenant, provided you have surrounded yourself with good people and you choose the lieutenant best suited to the particular decision. Don't assume that because you are ultimately responsible for decisions you have to make them all. The sign of major league leaders is their willingness to let others make decisions for which they will be responsible.

MACHIAVELLIAN PRINCIPLES FOR TODAY'S LEADER

Machiavelli put forth the following Principles for effective leadership:

- A talented leader realised no policy is without peril. He examines the options and selects the best while realising no policy is perfect.
- The preservation of civil unity and prevention of foreign invasion justify almost any action a leader can take.
- Men must either be cajoled or crushed; injured slightly and he will avenge himself.
- Don't submit to evil to avoid war.
- Luck plays the greatest role in leadership success, and luck favours the bold.
- In a conquered nation, it is acceptable to kill the male leaders, but leave the women and citizens' property alone.
- In newly conquered territory, implement harsh policies immediately, but slowly introduce benefits and mercies.
- The major responsibilities of a leader include: being a lover of virtue, encouraging the talents of the citizenship, letting citizens keep their property, maintaining incorruptible and ethical ministers and judges, and defending the country against foreign domination.

Machiavelli has become too closely and mistakenly associated with some of the leadership issues he examined in The Prince, particularly with the phrase "the ends justify the means". In a lawful society, regulated to achieve high standards of public accountability, the ends used are constantly monitored and must comply with the highest standards, standards that Machiavelli stood for all his life, standards that he set, standards that wanted to be more ethical, and standards that were more effective and that would increase the chances of lasting success. The word "Machiavellian" in our dictionary is a poor testament to a man who was both of his time and centuries ahead of it.

Peter Fitzgerald, Editor

ncy cooperation facilitated by IT

Strategic Management Initiative and Core Services

Clonakilty Garda Station: Community Policing in a Rural Garda District

strike. Reuss-Iaani's (1983) findings in respect of the failed attempt to introduce a rational management model to the New York Police Department are echoed in the above mentioned attempts at introducing PD&R and CAD (Computer Aided Despatch) method of managing operational resources in Dublin Metropolitan Region to An Garda Síochána. Gould (1997) goes as far as to propose that exposure to the policing environment develops a police personality which is conservative and idealistic as well as cynical and resistant to new ideas.[10]

FOSTERING AN EFFECTIVE CULTURE

16

Faced with this resistance how does An Garda Síochána go about fostering and developing an effective culture for strategic change management? In examining this issue Bartlett and Ghosal outlined the building blocks of an effective culture for strategic management;

(a) DISCIPLINE – Unlike compliance, discipline does not primarily rely on authority relationships or management policies. Self-discipline is encouraged through the careful socialisation of employees, which then becomes second nature to them. Discipline is finely but vitally distinguished from compliance in that discipline is fostered by the provision of clear standards to which employees feel committed, plus open and rapid feedback, in other words, direct management intervention.

(b) TRUST – Instead of increasingly impersonal and distant relationships, most companies have been able to build trust and openness into their behavioural climate. "They need to break down the barriers … created to isolate them from complexities and realities of operational work"

(c) SUPPORT – Traditionally, delegation from boss to subordinate is policed by top-down control. The desirable alternative is usually the supportive managerial style, also called a coaching style of management.

(d) STRETCH – In most organisations the horizons and creativity of people are constrained by the low-level and short-term ambitions of the organisation. In self-renewing organisations the internal climate encourages and sometimes induces employees to reach for far-reaching objectives.[11]

Schein (1992) suggests that the most powerful primary mechanisms in which leaders of organisations typically embed and reinforce organisational culture are:[12]

• What leaders pay attention to, control and measure

• Leaders' reactions to critical incidents and organisational crises

- Deliberate role modelling, teaching and coaching by leaders
- Criteria for allocation of rewards and status
- Criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, retirement and excommunication.

For Schein, other mechanisms such as organisational structure, systems and procedures and formal statements of organisational philosophy are seen as secondary. They work to reinforce culture only if they are consistent with the primary mechanisms.

If An Garda Síochána is to change from a service culture to a performance culture we must develop a clear corporate culture that is compatible with that change. Otherwise anxiety, fear and tension may filter down through the organisation at all levels. This could result in the conscious and unconscious resistance to change, attempts at self-preservation and the substitution of personal goals for a clear focus on organisational goals e.g. the demise of PD&R in the organisation.

17

REFERENCES

1 Police contact with the Mentally Disordered, (1992)The Police Research Group, Home Office, London.
2 ESRI Survey of Attitudes to The Gardai (1994), by Miriam Murphy and Brendan J. Whelan .
3 Research and Evaluation Services (RES) (1999) Garda Siochana Public Attitudes Survey.
4 Fielding N. (1988) Joining Forces, London: Routledge.
5 Handy C.B. (1993) Understanding Organisations, Fourth Edition, Penguin and McLean A. and Marshall J., Cultures at Work, Local Government Training Board, and October 1988.
6 Johnson G. (19920 Managing Strategic Change: Strategy Culture and Action, Long Range Planning, vol. 25, pp28-36.
7 Skolnick J. (1966) Justice without Trial, New York: John Wiley.
8 Reiner R. (1997) Policing and the Police, in Maguire M. et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (2nd Edition), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9 Keith Duffy "Do they mean us?" Garda Review Vol 28 No. 9 October 2000.
10 Gould L. (1997) "Can an old dog be taught new tricks"? Policing, 20,2.
11 Chatterton M. (1993) "Targeting Community Beat Officers: Organisational Constraints and Resistence", Policing and Society, 3 189-203.
12 Schein E. (1992) Organisational Culture and Leadership, San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

Community Policing in a Rural Garda district

Superintendent Noel Galwey

Noel Galwey

18

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

The Garda Síochána is providing a police service in the State since 1922 in a non-political and duty-orientated customer-focused manner towards all the people in the ideology of the first Commissioner Michael Staines (1922) that "The civic Guard will depend for the successful performance of their duty not on arms or numbers, but on the moral force they exercise as representatives of a civil authority which is dependent on its existence on the free will of the people whose servants the members of the police force are". The Garda Síochána in its early days ensured the survival and stability of the state by constantly adapting to the environment and needs of the public it serves. This was achieved through the years, since then, through leadership and the management of change which has caused the transition from the traditional model of control to one of commitment to the core values of the organisation such as service and courtesy to the public, teamwork approach which values participative management, professionalism and cost consciousness, pride of doing a good job and strict compliance with the spirit and provision of our laws. This leads to customer care and the management of resources towards customer needs. Garda management is deeply involved in the new public management initiative since the early 1990s with the introduction of the Corporate Strategy Plan 1993-97, and the mission encapsulated in the present Corporate Strategy Plan 2000-2004[1]. The mission of An Garda Síochána is "to achieve the highest attainable level of personal protection, community commitment and state security", devolving the responsibility of achievement down to the lowest level of accountability in the Garda Síochána which is at district level. It is at this level that planning, implementation and delivery of service takes place (Beer et al 1984). In rural areas this involves managing and applying resources with the personal touch to the needs of the community. Customer needs are constantly changing and the police must manage change to satisfy these demands in accordance with the `choice' and `voice' of the citizen who is `empowered' to demand a high standard of service (Kommel, 1993).

The rural district is isolated and distanced geographically from central authority and expert specialist facilities at Divisional and Regional centres thereby creating the necessity to up-skill and develop personnel to be self sufficient. Manpower and resources must be managed skilfully to ensure maximum service and efficiency. This involves co-ordinating the staff and resources of a number of small stations with a larger pivotal station in a geographically convenient basis within the usually vast rural district. There are two or three such groupings in every rural district which must be managed to maximise the police service provided.

Organisation culture must be continuously managed in congruence with organisation policy to ensure customer-friendly positive attitude, high morale and professionalism.

The frontline gardaí present the face of the service and must be managed, educated, focused, and empowered to develop a sense of responsibility so that the people they serve will recognise their integrity, personal commitment and effectiveness in their respective districts. The future of the organisation depends on these well educated and well motivated gardaí – to ensure that the best service is provided to the community. Organisational change must be carefully managed to ensure increased effectiveness in the future.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN RURAL IRELAND - THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1979 the Garda Commissioner set up a study team to investigate ways of improving the garda service in rural Ireland. The study team found that the organisational structure of the Garda Síochána was still substantially the same as that which existed at the time of its predecessor force, the Royal Irish Constabulary prior to 1922. The country had been divided into twenty three divisions, eighteen of which covered rural Ireland and each division was divided into a number of districts. Within each rural district there were, on average, between six and nine sub-districts.

19

The study group recommended the rural community policing model and that each rural district be divided into two areas for policing administrative purposes. Each area would have an area headquarters within the district. Each area, consisting of four stations usually, would be administered by Sergeants with the Superintendent having overall responsibility. Clerical officers were assigned to each area headquarters to support and assist the Sergeant with clerical duties. The station opening hours would be flexible through morning, afternoon and evening. Only district and area headquarters would be open on Sundays. Radio telecommunications would be improved so that the district headquarters could contact all members on duty within the district by a two-way radio system and a patrol vehicle would be allocated to each area. Rural policing provided greater garda cover over longer periods within the administrative area in the rural area covered, even in the most remote rural areas.

An increased level of attacks on the elderly living in remote areas, sometimes alone, created the demand for garda action to combat this problem. Garda management introduced the Rural Community Policing Initiative in rural Ireland in 1991 in fourteen districts covering about 25 per cent of the rural state. This involved strategic management of human resources within the garda service, with members deployed locally, with specific plans concerning hours of duty, opening of stations, new administrative procedures and performance indicators. The system was adapted to rural and remote areas, and it was modified to suit current policing needs. It required an extensive commitment to resources and was guaranteed success through the integrated desire of both the communities

and the gardaí to make it work. The initiative was introduced in each area in a participative fashion with the Deputy Commissioner involving local management and operational core co-operation on the ground. The organisation culture was managed on the basis of Lewin's change formula of unfreezing, changing and refreezing[2]. The commitment of top management through the line management of the district officer and the Garda membership in the areas has been instrumental in its success. Extending the service to the whole rural state was a realistic ambition as it has proved very effective.

20

ADVANTAGES

Because each area works as a co-ordinated team, maximum use is made of available personnel and resources. The civilian clerical staff at area headquarters has both centralised sub-district records and decentralised district records, and frees more members for outdoor duty. Under the initiative more patrols and checkpoints are now performed in all areas including remote areas, giving a greater sense of security to the community.

The model ensures that a Sergeant, drawn from the area stations, is on duty over the twenty four hours thereby facilitating hands-on management. This involves briefing of units reporting for duty, designating duties and focused proactive patrolling, monitoring, debriefing and analysis of performance. It also provides guidance, leadership and support for the frontline gardaí at all times.

Response to emergencies has improved with the greater availability of gardaí over the entire area and greater use being made of official cars and modern communication technology with computers reducing time consumption on paperwork. It enables members to operate on a broader base and become more familiar with their entire district rather than being confined to the former sub-district. Management can now plan and control the development of all its resources within the district more readily, in advance, particularly in assigning gardaí to police events, operations and to indoor duties in stations.

> *The initiative brings the garda service more to the community through more active patrolling, community-based initiatives such as youth orientated activity and schools programmes, Community Alert, Business Watch and such community-based problem solving initiatives as required.*
> Commissioner Pat Byrne, 1995.

RURAL COMMUNITY POLICING - THE BEST WAY FORWARD

The Rural Community Policing model is proving to be most effective in the provision of the garda service to a community which is familiar with and on friendly terms with the gardaí. This provides a greater sense of security in the community. The gardaí implementing the system are

pleased with the greater variety and enlargement of work scope within the administrative area, leading to increased job enrichment, motivating them to improved job satisfaction much as described by Herzberg (1966) in his hygiene and motivator factors[3].

Evaluation of experience from operating the system found the co-ordinated effort very effective and found the organisation culture very positive. The channels of communication are short (matrix) and the atmosphere of the leadership-centred culture as visualised by Kotter[4] is there. It replaces the parochial fragmented service provided by individual stations orientated towards their own parochial sub-district focus. The rural community policing model co-ordinates and focuses the co-ordinated effort of the gardaí within the administrative area, delivering the public attitude survey identified policing priorities of annual policing plans and the Corporate Strategy Plan of the Garda Síochána through the management of the Superintendent of the district as line manager. The co-ordination of the Sergeants' duties on the different rosters enables the provision of an expanded period of supervision cover, leading to extended guidance, encouragement and training of the front-line service to the standard required by the Quality Service Initiative. It is evident that the model enables the Superintendent to concentrate more on corporate policy initiatives and to involve the gardaí in a participative fashion in preparing and implementing the District Annual Policing Plan as well as being committed to the "walk about" management style facilitated by the services of the Sergeant being on duty on extended periods to deal with frontline management.

21

The model is an exemplary one and deserves to be extended to all rural areas. There is a misconceived political view abroad that the system will lead to the closing of garda stations in rural areas and the decay of village life. This, of course, is not the case. In fact the opposite is the position. The gardaí will still be stationed in the village station but working on a co-ordinated basis from the area headquarters.   The rural policing initiative is a tangible improvement in delivering more effective policing services and it merits even wider implementation.

Manpower constraint is a problem in rural districts as elsewhere in An Garda Síochána and the public sector generally. The GERM (Garda Establishment Redistribution Model) allocates Gardaí according to a long list of activities and factors which include population, crime, road accidents and other policing, criminal justice and administrative tasks. Reducing manpower in a geographically large district requires constant planning to maximise the service provided by available resources. The policing of rural districts which are not included in the community policing scheme is still operating under the old parochial fragmented RIC system. It is apparent that the service in these districts is improved by dividing the district into co-ordinated units operating from each town

base, thus amalgamating smaller rural stations with the larger base in the adjoining town and, in so doing, pooling and co-ordinating the personnel and resources along the lines of the Rural Community Policing System. The gardaí in one-man stations are brought in from isolation to active main stream policing and comradeship at the town stations, where resources such as the official car, computers, and telecommunications/fax machines, are available. Local knowledge is shared with the greater garda cover over longer periods in the co-ordinated areas. This ensures that local knowledge is maintained and not lost with the departure or retirement of any of these members serving in the one-man stations.

24

COMMUNITY POLICING ASPECT

It is through the community policing approach, in the main, that the police service is provided in the rural district involving a close, friendly, relationship between the community and the gardaí. The gardaí are part of and live in their community and possess the same social values, lifestyle, feelings, need for security as well as the same needs and wants as the community.

Gardaí are actively involved in voluntary groups, clubs and associations in their community. Gardaí help in the development of the youth through involvement and training of underage teams, mainly in field games, but also in a range of other activities as diverse as judo and lifesaving.

Gardaí are strongly organised in many community organisations helping people to come together to meet their needs and to tackle common problems, encouraging voluntary and informal structures of working together to create added value to the community.

Gardaí are committed to servicing the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, Community Alert Schemes, Business Watch Schemes and Coastal Watch. There is a special schools programme in rural districts dealing with national and secondary schools where talks are given by gardaí on drugs, alcohol abuse, social controls and advice on the laws of the State. This familiarises the students with gardaí and instils character building and positive attitude formation in the students.

The established procedure of applying the resources of the garda service to the needs of the local community must be a strong objective of local management and gardaí in the districts. The gardaí perform duty ranging from traffic duty at funerals to the investigation of the most serious crime. The duties of the gardaí are sometimes focussed towards tidy towns and such achievements, which includes keeping the area vandal-free by giving special attention to prevent damage to local amenities, flower displays, public parks and property generally during the years in preparation for environmental competitions and preservation of the beauty of the areas,

especially during night time – building a bond between the community and the gardaí.

Interagency co-operation is a strong aspect of policing in the rural district involving the local authorities, health board, schools, customs and excise, social welfare service and various voluntary groups such as farming, traders, travellers and residential associations.

There is a good working relationship with the Custom and Excise Service and the Navy on the ground especially along the coast in accordance with the memorandum of understanding between the Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners (Customs). This was adopted in January 1996 under the Joint Task Force of the Minister for Justice in the fight against illegal drug smuggling and pooling of information, resulting in a refocusing of interagency resources.

25

There is a good working relationship with the Local Authorities. Local Bye-Laws involving one way streets, parking, etc. are mainly prepared by the gardaí in consultation with the local authority officials and elected representatives, traders, residential and interested groups in the town.

The District Officer attends Urban District Council meetings on invitation for discussion with local councillors on local or garda initiatives. This is a good forum from which customer demands and perceptions of events and situations of public representatives are received for future processing by local management in planning and managing change.

POLICING DIVERSE CULTURES

The gardaí in the rural districts are becoming increasingly involved in policing intercultural groups as part of the general community. This includes –

- Hard to reach groups in the fringes of society

- Entrants with various religious and cultural backgrounds, who have been settling from Europe and USA for the past twenty years, especially on the scenic coastline. The influx of new age travellers and hippies to remote rural areas bring, with them, sometimes, anti-social attitudes and an illegal drugs culture.

- The traveller community represents a strong subculture in the rural communities.

- An increased number of refugees and asylum-seekers.

The segmented policing approach[5] is being put forward in dealing with the different groups especially hard to reach groups in the fringes of

society as recommended in the UK Police Research Series (Bradley, 1998). This involves the recognition of the different ethnic and cultural groups with different attitudes, perceptions, beliefs and religions[6], and the policing and liaison of gardaí with each group. The gardaí are trained and educated in the right attitude and in the skills to communicate positively with the various groups.

The gardaí build up a communication avenue and interaction where information in the two way process. The group concerned gains trust in the gardaí, the positive two-way rapport creates respect, and the correct perception of the police by the ethnic or hard to reach group leads to satisfaction on both sides. In summary this means the recognition and policing of many different sectors of society within the general public. This segmented policing does not necessarily imply differences in standards as distinct from differences in styles of policing. It implies understanding differences and respecting differences. The segmented policing approach is the way forward in policing, and in providing police services for different and diverse groups.

DEVELOPMENTS LIKELY IN RURAL POLICING IN THE FUTURE

The way forward for rural policing is through the extension of the rural community policing initiative to all rural districts in the country in the interests of maximising the provision of police services. In the meantime, rural districts will need to be managed on the basis of the framework of the rural community policing model through co-ordinating the manpower and resources of a number of geographically connected stations within the rural district to work as a co-ordinated unit, giving greater services over longer periods in the geographically divided rural district.

The services can be improved by closer management of patrols when not engaged in incident calls through focused proactive planned patrolling. It involves knitting planned operations and duties into the duties of the incident-response patrol. The UK Audit Commission on Effective Patrol[7] (Flannery, 1998) found that managers must carry out robust, objective analysis of what patrol officers actually do, and make it clear both what is expected of them and what they can achieve with resources they have rather than complain about lack of resources in the provision of a police service. The message here is for police managers to manage patrolling activity through the focused proactive intelligence driven patrolling from available resources rather than concede to resource shortage. Managers must manage available resources and not persist with demanding more resources or blaming shortage of resources for lack of performance (UK Audit Commission)[8].

Community policing is the way forward with the police bringing the service to the people in their own surroundings in rural and remote areas.

26

Police must police the community in the crime prevention, problem solving and intelligence driven mould in close conjunction with statutory and voluntary bodies, associations etc. The youth must be targeted involving them in games and occupations, managing their spare time and character building thus preventing juvenile delinquency, public disorder and by educating them of the ills of underage drinking, drugs, etc. This is best done through schools and club programmes.

The segmented policing approach by the police through the various groupings in society as well as ethnic groups i.e. age groups differentiation, unsocial groups, travellers, refugees, et cetera, by building confidence and liaising with such groups is the way forward. In this way the police will be dealing with several "publics" within the "general public".

27

CONCLUSION

Customer care must be in line with the standards espoused by the Garda Quality Service Bureau, the Garda Corporate Strategy Plan, the Garda Annual Policing Plan, and the local District Policing Plan.

Organisation culture must be managed towards positive attitudes and change. This is best done through continuous formal and informal communication by local managers on the ground close to and with the frontline operational core. "Unfreezing", "changing" and "re-freezing" is effective. Organisation effectiveness is only brought about by good communication, flexibility, creativity and genuine psychological commitment.

Good leadership and good membership must be blended into each other in an effective organisation involving every member. It is these good leadership skills at all levels which must be developed to ensure that the vision for the future is realised and that the road map is there to ensure that the destination is reached. This will ensure that frontline gardai are well educated in the techniques of community policing, on being self directed in problem-solving, the use of discretion and the quick response (FBI, 1999).

Local management in the rural district must continue to scan the external environment anticipating and discovering the needs of the community in which they serve and apply the resources of the local garda service to the local needs. The demands of all the other stakeholders including the government, Garda apex management and the internal Garda environment must be considered when managing the local service provision (Kauter, Summers, 1987).

So many people want services "free, perfect and now" and to meet this

challenge we must renew our energy, and make the best use of our resources to give An Garda Síochána a healthy organisation propulsion under the framework of the Garda Síochána Corporate Strategy Plan 2000-2004 – through adjustment and re-adjustment, with trust and credibility, to ensure success with the personal touch.

28

REFERENCES

1 SO (2000) Garda Corporate Strategy Document 2000 - 2004.

2 Schein E.H. (1988) Organisation Psychology, 3rd Edition.

3 Mullins, L. (1999) Management and Organisational Behaviour.

4 Kotter, J. (1990) What Leaders Really Do.

5 Bradley, Russell, (1998) UK Police Research Series, Paper 96, Public Expectations and Perceptions of Policing.

6 MacGreil, Ml.(1996) Prejudice in Ireland Revisited.

7 Flannery, K, (1998) Streetwise: The Audit Commission Study on Effective Police Patrol, The Way Forward, 3rd Research and Development Conference.

8 Loveday, B. (1995) Contemporary Challenges To Police Management In England And Wales: Developing Strategies For Effective Service Delivery, June 1995, Policing And Society Vol. 5, Pp. 281-301.

Managing interagency co-operation by sharing information enhanced by IT

Thomas Conway

Superintendent Thomas Conway

Many organisations today believe that the key assets of an organisation are knowledge and core competencies from which all products and services derive. A very important part of organisational success in the contemporary view is developing a proper understanding of the environment, opening the organisation to outside influences, and, in general, adjusting the organisation to contemporary social and ethical currents.

The main focus of inter agency co-operation between the gardaí and other organisations should be to encourage collaboration between individuals, organisations and sectors, thus providing a better use of combined resources. The primary functions should be to draw up and work towards the implementation of the strategy for economic, social, and cultural development within a specified area or district. Garda participation should demonstrate a commitment to multi-agency co-operation in such development, in so far as it pertains to core areas of policing and crime prevention functions.

Information technology has played a major role in the changing process of management by providing powerful tools for managers to carry out both their traditional and newer roles. Contemporary information systems permit management to obtain, analyse and comprehend vast quantities of data. With the benefit of information technology managers can monitor, plan and forecast with more precision and speed than ever before. Technology is all around us, affecting our lives in more ways than we realise. With the increased emphasis society places on information technology we should all become more aware of what it is, and what it can do for us.

The challenge facing us is imminent but the benefits will be rewarding. Professor Vollmer in his book "The Police and Modern Society" in outlining the expectation of society of their police force states[1] *"the citizen expects police officers to have the wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the strength of Samson, the patience of Job, the leadership of Moses, the kindness of good Samaritans, the strategical training of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the carpenter of Nazareth and finally, an intimate knowledge of every branch of the natural, biological and social sciences."*

IDENTIFYING OUR NEEDS

The first step in this process is to identify key indicators that might suggest that the adoption of such a strategy is a requirement or that the

likely benefits resulting from the adoption of such a strategy would be such that An Garda Síochána should in fact adopt this strategy.

The National Crime Forum was established by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in February 1998. The forum members were appointed by the Minister. The forum's brief was:

"to canvass comment, assessments and suggestions on crime and crime-related issues from the general public and from national and international experts. The Minister asked that a report on the proceedings be prepared which could be taken into account in the further development of crime policy, and which would help clarify the issues which will need to be addressed in a forthcoming white paper on crime and in the establishment of a crime council".

30

The report was published in 1998. Paragraph 9, p39 states:

"The link between socio-economic deprivation, exclusion and marginalisation, on the one hand, and crime on the other is sufficiently well documented to make it clear that tackling those factors would be the biggest single step towards effective crime prevention. (The general point can be made even though the availability and quality of statistics on the situation in Ireland make it difficult to paint an up-to-date picture or to draw up plans for the future.) As we have noted earlier in this report, certain types of offences tend to be committed by offenders who live in the most disadvantaged areas of our cities, areas which have a poor quality of infrastructure and high levels of unemployment. …"

The report clearly identifies the need for a multi-agency approach to the fight against all forms of crime within Ireland. The report acknowledges that for this approach to succeed it is necessary that an exchange of information between the various agencies will be required. Paragraph 4, p178 states:

"There may be many reasons for the present state of affairs; we will return to them later in the chapter. One underlying reason, however has been the tradition of secrecy and lack of welcome for research, which has characterised the official administration of the criminal justice system in past years. The Forum was very pleased to note that this culture of secrecy is being replaced with an openness and sense of enquiry which would have been unthinkable some years ago."

Paragraph 8, p179 continues:

"Increasingly today, the quality and effectiveness of management depends on prompt, accurate and appropriate information. Good management is management, which asks the right questions and insists on having the answers available in good time. The right questions relate to information about the context in which the work is carried out (in this instance, the environments in which crime is

committed and the characteristics of those who are its perpetrators and its victims)."

The Garda Corporate Strategy, p8, notes:

"The ever increasing demands for information both from external and internal customers will be largely resolved by the data gathering and analytical ability of the Garda PULSE computer system and by a central call-handling information centre. However these will require further development and some time for the normal learning curve to reach proficiency.   This may take time to contribute to overall effectiveness." [2]

31

INTER AGENCY CO-OPERATION

Inter-agency co-operation is designed to bring together statutory and non-statutory agencies such as the gardaí, local authority officials, health board and community groups as a means of ensuring greater co-operation between such service providers and thereby to enhance co-ordination in the delivery of such services. Examples of inter-agency co-operation at present in use are:

- The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1997[3],
- Memorandum of Understanding concerning the relationship between the Customs and Excise Service of the Revenue Commissioners and the Garda Síochána with respect to Drugs Law Enforcement.
- Criminal Assets Bureau
- Department of Environment
- Health Boards

INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Information can be knowledge and knowledge is power. There is a keen demand for information held by An Garda Síochána. Often this is just a curious interest or, more frequently now, people seeking to advance some matter in the common good. It tends to be current, individual and pervasive, often obtained under legal powers e.g. search warrant. The balance or test is often subject to the Data Protection Legislation i.e. Data Protection Act 1998. However, there are statutory exemptions and indeed the European models indicate separate agencies and committees.

AGENCIES

In "Managing Core Public Services" Dr. David McKevitt describes agencies as Street Level Public Organisations (SLPO's). Dr. McKevitt describes how such professionals and citizen – clients meet face to face and deal with each other. He states that these SLPO's cannot be seen in a void.   They relate to and are affected by their environment.   He identifies and categorises five key aspects in the environment common to SLPO's as at Figure 1.

FIGURE 1   McKevitt's Model [4]

32

The process requires that on-going consultation is carried out between service providers and the public to:

- Facilitate co-operation between Agencies.
- Promote the participation of the Community and service customers in the design and evaluation of service provision.

Agencies can include groups who have a primary goal to serve the public. My research also highlights that senior Garda management is fully aware that sharing of knowledge is no longer a national issue. The challenges will come in terms of new agencies e.g. Interpol (Lyons, France www.interpol.int), Europol, The Hague, Netherlands www.europol.eu and the EU.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Many people are under the impression that only those individuals working in traditional "computer" jobs are affected by the ever-changing world of information technology. This myth is simply not true. From accounting to police work, information technology affects nearly every job in some way or another. Information systems contain information about significant people, places, and things. Input, Processing and Output are the three activities in an information system that produce the information organisations need to make decisions, control operations and solve problems.

RESEARCH SURVEY

My research carried out in the Garda Síochána shows the level of importance and the focus assigned to this issue. Figures 2,3 and 4 provide an outline of how this subject is viewed and indeed evaluated by Senior Management. Seventy-one per cent believe consultation on inter-agency initiative is increasing. Ninety-four per cent believe in sharing information between agencies. ninety-one per cent believe An Garda Síochána is becoming more responsive to community needs.

FIGURE 2 71 PER CENT BELIEVE CONSULTATION ON INTER-AGENCY INITIATIVE IS INCREASING


Consultation throughout the organisation on the inter-agenc
initiative is increasing on a regular basis

Strongly Disagree 1%
Disagree 11%
Nuetral 17%
Strongly Agree 11%
Agree 60%

FIGURE 3 94 PER CENT AGREE ON SHARING INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENCIES

33

It is desirable to exchange information between agencies

Nuetral 5%
Disagree 1%
Strongly Disagree 0%
Agree 53%
Strongly Agree 41%

FIGURE 4: 91 PER CENT AGREE AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA IS BECOMING MORE RESPONSIVE TO COMMUNITY NEEDS

An Garda Siochana is growing mor
responsive to community needs

Disagree 3%
Nuetral 5%
Strongly Disagree 1%
Agree 56%
Strongly Agree 35%

CONCLUSION

The need for change regarding inter-agency co-operation and how best it can be managed and disseminated throughout the relevant stakeholders is going to grow significantly in the future.

An I.T. solution with common standards will benefit such a programme, as data collected by one agency will be available immediately to other co-operating agencies. In all such organisations a Geographical Information

System (G.I.S.) must serve the needs of all users and fit seamlessly into the information technology strategy of the organisation. In this regard the Garda Síochána is no different. The most appropriate data model must be chosen, the most effective data input method selected and suitable analysis procedures designed. The experiences gained during the implementation of the Pulse System would be of significant benefit to An Garda Síochána in this respect.

There is little doubt that the adoption of a strategy for handling geographical information within An Garda Síochána and developing the method to disseminate such information to other relevant agencies would be of significant benefit to the organisation. It will enhance our ability to respond to incidents of crime, in the short term, and will assist in planning for the future. In addition it will facilitate greater co-operation and the exchange of information with other agencies as envisaged with the establishment of the National Crime Council.

34

While the cost factor may be an issue it would appear that the investment would be justified and the likely benefits would indicate that regardless of the cost this is a strategy that is necessary and should be pursued.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Legislative change will be necessary to ensure that data can be exchanged in appropriate cases. Caution is required with regard to taking giant leaps. Data quality and its classification will need to be monitored, developed and definitions agreed. The Data Protection Commissioner has a role to play in setting down standards and must be part of the whole process.
- The E-Business solution model will need to be incorporated and fully supported by our partnering agencies. The various government initiatives that have been established will enable the citizen to adapt to e-commerce or a person-to-person electronic solution.
- A fully integrated system with Geographical Information Systems and on-line caller identifier needs to be established, thus ensuring that when a caller rings in, the subscriber information will automatically populate the fields of any IT solution.

REFERENCES

1 Patterson Smith Reprint Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement and social Problems (1971)The Police and Modern Society.

2 An Garda Síochána (2000) Corporate Strategy Document 2000 – 2004.

3 Department of Justice Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1997.

4 McKevitt, D. (1998) Managing Core Public Services, Blackwell Publishers

Garda tracking of asylum seekers and illegal entrants arriving in Ireland through Rosslare Europort

Michael Murphy

Chief Superintendent Michael R. Murphy

INTRODUCTION

The Government and An Garda Síochána have greatly increased the resources available to the Garda National Immigration Bureau. In May 2001 request for tender documents were issued for a comprehensive computer system for on-line data entry and retrieval for the Garda National Immigration Bureau. A contract was subsequently awarded and a pilot system was implemented at GNIB Headquarters, Harcourt Square. The system is designed to improve the service provided to asylum seekers and increase the productivity of the Bureau.

Two recent Communique articles described and documented the rapid strides made by An Garda Síochána in immigration service; Claire O'Sullivan's *Migration Management - Lessons Ireland can learn from other countries and Customer Service for immigrants and asylum seekers* by Detective Chief Superintendent Martin Donnellan. This article should be seen as a third and earlier episode, going back just three years to the point where An Garda Síochána had a sudden and large increase in immigrants and asylum seekers. This article tells that story through the eyes of the immigration service at Rosslare Europort.

Immigration controls have been in existence at Rosslare Europort since the foundation of the State. Up to recently, the numbers of illegal entrants arriving at the port had been at low levels. Since 1997, the level of illegal entrants and asylum seekers arriving has increased at a rate which required swift management changes to cope with the inflow.

Since the numbers of asylum seekers and illegal entrants had increased by record levels it had become practically impossible for immigration officers to deal effectively and efficiently with the size of this problem, and to subsequently keep track of the whereabouts of these people throughout the State, using the resources then available to them. This article outlines the practices then current, and describes the procedures which were not technology based, and details the recommendations then made aimed at ensuring a quality immigration service in line with the changing environment in which we operated.

GATEWAY AGENCY

Rosslare Europort is the gateway to and from Europe and the United Kingdom. When passengers disembark from vessels which have arrived at the port, either on foot or by vehicle, they must first pass through

immigration control before being allowed to enter the State. The Garda Síochána is the agency which is responsible in law for immigration control at all points of entry to and from the State.

36

APPOINTMENT, POWER AND TRAINING OF IMMIGRATION OFFICERS
Members of An Garda Siochána are appointed as Immigration Officers under a Warrant of Appointment by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Only Members of An Garda Síochána who have been appointed as Immigration Officers under a warrant of appointment by the Minister can exercise the power to refuse entry to a person who is attempting to enter the State, after extensive legal and administrative requirements have been complied with.

ACTIVITY AT EUROPORT
The Europort at Rosslare has become one of the busiest ports in the State and the number of berths for ships, and the terminal building and infrastructure, have expanded greatly over the past decade. Table 1 shows the level of incoming traffic through the port for the year 2000:

TABLE 1 VOLUME THROUGH EUROPORT DURING 2000.

Passengers	Cars	Coaches	Freight Units	Trade Cars
1,353,418	361,171	5,592	105,243	70,658

DUTIES OF IMMIGRATION OFFICERS
Gardaí derive their powers and obligations to carry out their duties from the Aliens Act 1935. Since the passing of this act, amending acts and statutory instruments have been added. The most important of these was the passing of the Aliens (Amendment) (No.3) Order 1997 (S.I. No. 277 of 1997), which came into force on the 29th June 1997. Before the passing of this order, immigration controls were applied only to persons arriving in the State from mainland Europe. Since the passing of the order all persons arriving in the state including those from Great Britain and Northern Ireland are subject to immigration control. The Refugee Act 1996 confers additional powers on Gardaí acting as Immigration Officers. The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 provides power to the Gardaí to combat trafficking in illegal immigrants.

PURPOSE OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL
The main purpose of Immigration Control is to control the entry of people to the State by operating an immigration control which deters the arrival of inadmissible persons, determines the eligibility of persons seeking to enter the State, and refuses admission to persons who do not meet the criteria for admission. An Garda Síochána aims to carry out these controls in an effective, efficient and as caring manner as possible, bearing in mind the necessity to carry out these controls without adversely affecting the economic life of the Europort; and with as little inconvenience as possible to the movement of people through the port.

**LEGAL DEFINITION IN IRISH LAW OF ALIEN,
ILLEGAL ALIEN AND ASYLUM SEEKER**

An alien is any person who is not an Irish Citizen. Persons who are born in Great Britain or in Northern Ireland are not classed as aliens. Aliens may enter the State subject to the conditions applying to their entry being complied with, which means they must have a valid passport and visa unless they are citizens of a State for which a passport and visa is not required. This requirement is decided by agreements between States and is usually based on the doctrine of reciprocity. An illegal alien is a person from another State who has not got permission to be in this country. If and when such a person arrives at a port or other point of entry to the State, they can be refused permission to enter the State, and repatriated to the country from which they arrived. Should a person enter the State by avoiding immigration controls, or having been allowed to enter subject to visa requirements being met and then breaches the terms of these requirements and remains in the State, the person then becomes an illegal alien.

37

An Asylum Seeker is a person who arrives at immigration control who would normally be refused permission to enter the State as an illegal alien but since the enactment into law of the Refugee Act, 1996, when a person arrives at a point of entry to the State and claims political asylum, the normal procedure where such a person is refused permission to enter the State is put in abeyance and the person is required to make an application for a declaration as a refugee and, pending a decision being made on this application, is allowed to enter the State. Where an asylum seeker successfully avoids immigration control and enters the State illegally, once that person calls to a Garda station or to the office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner in Dublin, the same procedure applies.

NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS ARRIVING AT ROSSLARE EUROPORT

Since the enactment of the Refugee Act, 1996, the numbers of Asylum seekers arriving at Europort Rosslare has increased considerably as outlined in Table 2 below, with a one hundred and twenty six per cent rise in the 2000 figures over 1999. This level of increase has significant implications for managing the overall level of immigration control at the port, with the knock-on effect on record keeping, general administration, and tracking of these asylum seekers, many of whom – as will be shown – become illegal aliens. The figures include asylum seekers who were detected attempting to enter the country through immigration control and those who were caught trying to enter the country illegally by hiding in freight units and who, when they were discovered by immigration officers in the course of a search of the freight units, sought asylum.

On the 8th December 2001 eight were found dead in the back of a truck at Drinagh, Co Wexford. The truck had entered the State through Rosslare Europort. These tragic deaths are a sobering reminder of the

lengths people will go to improve their quality of life, and the lengths that criminal elements will go to exploit the weak and vulnerable.

TABLE 2 LEVEL OF IMMIGRATION ACTIVITY AT ROSSLARE EUROPORT

Rosslare Europort	Applications for Asylum	Refused Leave to Land
1996	Nil	116
1997	178	88
1998	386	128
1999	698	100
2000	1579	225

38

The figures under the caption "Refused leave to land", represent the numbers of entrants who arrived at the port who did not seek asylum and were repatriated to the country from which they arrived to the point of entry to the State at Rosslare Europort, as they did not satisfy the conditions as laid down at Section 5(3) of the Aliens Orders, 1946, and 1975 as amended by Article 5 of the Aliens (Amendment)(No. 2) Order, 1999

PROCESSING ASYLUM SEEKERS

The guidelines for processing applications for refugee status in Ireland have emerged from the provisions of the Refugee Act, 1996, as amended by the Immigration Act 1999 and the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000.   Under the Dublin Convention the first State within the European Union where an asylum seeker enters the EU is responsible for dealing with their application for asylum.   However, under the Dublin Convention (Implementation) Order 1997, where a person makes their application in this State they are still allowed to land and have their application processed in this State.

When an asylum seeker presents at immigration control or is caught trying to enter the country illegally and claims asylum, the procedures as laid down in the guidelines are strictly followed.   The entire process takes an average of over two hours per asylum seeker and the various forms to be completed by the immigration officer and served on the asylum seeker are long and detailed.   These forms are in printed form and have to be photocopied, some of them twice and others three times.

In addition to this procedure all documents in possession of the person must be checked to authenticate whether they are false or genuine. There was no computerised link to any database either internally within the State or externally.   All enquiries had to be made either by fax or telephone, or by consulting information circulated by bulletins.   This required a manual search which may not have contained up to date

information. This has since been redressed with computers, including database access with laptops. At present an improved computer network is under construction.

A file is then opened on the person with a unique reference number, which is supplied from a batch supplied to the immigration unit by the office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, and a manual record is kept in a register in the office. This whole procedure was carried out without any aid from computerisation or information technology – now this has all changed for the better with *PULSE* and computerisation. When the process is complete the asylum seeker is allowed to enter the State and is informed that overnight accommodation will be provided by the South Eastern Health Board and that they must attend at the office of the Refugee Application Commissioners office in Dublin the next day and that transportation will be provided from their accommodation to Dublin by the South Eastern Health Board.

39

The immigration officer contacts a representative of the South Eastern Health Board, who arranges accommodation for the person and sends a taxi to the Europort. The taxi collects the asylum seeker or seekers and brings them to the arranged accommodation, which is usually located in the Wexford area. Once the asylum seeker leaves the Europort area, that is the last contact that the person has with the Rosslare immigration authorities. When the asylum seeker has departed, the immigration officer sends the application for asylum direct to the Refugee Applications Commissioner in Dublin, by fax and post.

In accordance with laid down procedures, what should then happen is that the asylum seeker should travel to the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner the following day. However a number of asylum seekers do not do so, simply disappearing from their accommodation and becoming illegal entrants in the State. There is no retrievable record available in Garda immigration records of the numbers of asylum seekers who fail to turn up at the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, as the Immigration Officers at the Europort are not informed when an applicant for a declaration fails to turn up, nor are they informed of the final outcome of whether of not the asylum seeker in question has or has not been granted or refused asylum.

Those asylum seekers who do go to the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner must go through the whole administrative process again. They will then be issued with a Temporary Residence Certificate (TRC), which contains relevant personal information and, subject to the provisions of the Refugee Act 1996, the person will not be removed from the State before the final determination of the application.

DEPORTATION WHERE APPROPRIATE

Where the Refugee Applications Commissioner refuses to grant asylum to a person, Section 3 of the Immigration Act, 1999 makes provision for the Minister to make an order known as a "Deportation Order" which requires any non-national specified in the order to leave the State within such period as may be specified in the Order and to remain thereafter out of the State.

The relevant authority makes the order and passes it to the Gardaí at the Garda National Immigration Bureau for execution. The G.N.I.B. must then attempt to locate the asylum seeker and this may be very difficult. The last that may have been known of the asylum seeker may have been when that person left the immigration control at Rosslare. If the asylum seekers whereabouts are known, the G.N.I.B. then have to set a date, make arrangements to travel and have a number of Gardaí on standby to escort the deportee.

LANDING CARDS

All entrants entering the State who are not exempted are required to complete a Landing Card and submit it together with a valid passport, to an immigration officer on arrival in the State. The immigration officer will, on receipt of the Landing Card, and having interviewed the person concerned will issue him with the appropriate visa and will stamp the visa in the passport with a corresponding stamp being placed on the back of the landing card. This card is then sent to the Aliens Registration Officer in the Garda District in the State where the alien intends to reside. The Superintendent in charge of a Garda District is the Aliens Registration Officer for that District.

Should the entrant not comply with the conditions in the visa, i.e. overstaying the time allowed, then the alien's status changes from legal to illegal. This whole system was based on manual administration and involved the administration of thousands of landing cards each year. No accurate records were retrievable using this system and no one could say with accuracy how many illegal entrants in this category were in the State at that time. When entrants subject to landing card conditions leave the port area, no computerised data system was in place to track the person's movements in the State, to assist in locating and identifying them and to keep abreast of their status. Today, this has changed condiderably.

PROCEDURES IN PLACE IN UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

Research and practice in the United Kingdom and France all support the premise that a system for the tracking of asylum seekers and illegal entrants arriving in Ireland through Rosslare Europort should be in place. Having examined the systems in place in the United Kingdom and France at first hand and observed the application of information technology to

40

the administrative and operational areas of immigration control, it was clearly demonstrated to me that the only effective and efficient solution to this problem was an I.T. solution.

The information technology system in place in each country has its own benefits and had been developed to answer the needs of each particular country.   Following detailed analysis of the overall application of information technology the following recommendations were made to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Immigration controls at Rosslare Europort.

41

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN 2000

1. The introduction at Rosslare Europort of an information technology based database which would support on-line data entry, modification and enquiry of National Immigration Information, storing of digital photographs and fingerprints on-line, an OCR scanning facility to enable immediate checking of passports and other documentation, the provision of basic reports and statistics, production of registration identity cards with photographs and an ability to link entrants with their families, and generate all necessary administrative documentation, and to have incorporated in it a Management Information System governed by a need to know principle for access to the system.

2. The provision of a Wide Area Network link between Rosslare Europort and the Garda National Immigration Bureau, with additional links to the Garda P.U.L.S.E. Computer system, and restricted onward links to the United Kingdom and French and European data systems.

3. To facilitate the tracking of persons, each asylum seeker/illegal alien should be given a unique reference number which would be used in relation to the person until a final determination is made as to their status. This number would be used in all documentation in relation to the person by both An Garda Síochána and other agencies.

4. On-line computer links by secure intranet should be established between An Garda Síochána and the office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, to facilitate the exchange of essential information, and to allow for either agency to obtain information on the status of an Asylum Seeker.   Warnings should be built into the system to ensure it is updated and all statutory and administrative obligations are complied with.   Information of a confidential nature, which would give rise to Data Protection Act or Freedom of information Act concerns, should not be exchanged.

5. The Garda *PULSE* system should be linked to a National Database at

GNIB. And it should be suitably adapted to allow the general membership of the force to interrogate the system for basic information including photographs and to search and update the system as necessary for Asylum Seekers / Illegal entrants who are on the wanted list, or in respect of whom deportation orders are in force.

6. Immigration Officers at point of entry and the Garda Stations at Rosslare Harbour and Wexford should be linked by a Local Area Network to enable them to make basic enquiries on the system.

7. The Garda National Immigration Bureau as the agency with national responsibility for all matters relating to immigration should have responsibility to liase with the Superintendent at Wexford to ensure that proper supervision and control was exercised in the use of the system.

8. A state of the art CCTV system, with a movement activation capability together with a freeze frame digital download of a photograph from the system, should be installed at the Immigration Office at the Europort.

CONCLUSION

The overall research carried out throughout this article revealed that many weaknesses existed in the then procedures being used at Rosslare Europort in so far as ensuring that best practice was used to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the area of immigration control at the port and the subsequent tracking of asylum seekers and illegal entrants who have entered through the port and have dispersed throughout the State. The lack of information technology to support operational requirements was highlighted and the research abroad revealed how the proper application of information technology could greatly assist and enhance administrative and operational effectiveness. Research supported the proposition that the application of information technology systems developed to our own specifications and requirements would greatly enhance our ability to track and keep proper records on Asylum Seekers and Illegal Entrants.

Almost all the recommendations above have, by now, either been implemented or are in the process of implementation. They have greatly enhanced our operational efficiency in the tracking of asylum seekers and illegal entrants. They are proof of how fast An Garda Síochána can respond to emerging needs.

42